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The different philosophical aspects of historiography have always been consid-ered - in all ages — as the most exciting events of the living cosmos. Is it poss-
ible that one can deduce essential messages and relevant contents and draw conclu-
sions based upon different principles from the world that surrounds the individual, 
about a world with its quantitatively inestimable facts and fragments? 
The facts, fragments play a role not only as data referring to the tangible and 
eventful world surrounding us, but the billions of the inherent psychological, mental-
morphological decision-making processes also manifest themselves in such a way that 
they express the given reality of the present. The path-searching individual, search-
ing for his destiny in this totality of the living cosmos, does escape to the possibilities 
being presented by the philosophy of history in order to somehow to understand and 
to explain his own micro-cosmos. 
It is not fortuitous that historiography itself and the philosophy of history have 
been defined by the poet as "the most dangerous by-products of the intellect's chem-
istry." To understand the delicate nuances of this complex web of issues proves to be 
even more difficult since in our every day value systems — and here the researchers 
should be included in our listing - history mingles with politics, psychology, philoso-
phy, economics, etc. That is why it is crucial to investigate the peculiar relationship 
between history and philosophy, as their relationship can be deduced to such early roots 
wherefrom these two branches of sciences, together, seem to be enjoying an exclusive priori-
ty over others. 
This introductory idea, of course, will reach that level of difficulty only in the 
vast and unpenetrable jungle of space and time, where one can only find various 
value judgments of different historical times. 
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The philosophy of history, as it has been observed numerous times over the past 
2,500 years, has followed a very zigzagging and winding path, where, in most cases, 
the researchers have not been provided with a thread of Ariadne. 
The time-traveler historian often marvels at the fact that how many unexpected 
uncertainties are hidden behind those historical facts he is about to analyze and what 
he thinks are already in his possession. Years go by and he cannot really decide -
despite the methods he owns and that are considered to be scientific - that how 
much of the dissected facts on the operating table are narration, expanded fiction, or 
hypothesis, and as to what extent he is overwhelmed by the rhetorics of the past. 
Under such circumstances he himself starts to complicate his own situation 
because he cannot really decide why his belief in empiricism will not provide him 
with sufficient evidence. The need for verification cannot merely be considered as 
structural semantics, because the hermenautical background also becomes a defining 
factor where, following some logic, the individual statements, value-judgments man-
ifest themselves. Thus, it is an inevitable precondition that a historian does not create his-
tory, but that he writes history. 
The wide range of these issues were extensively dealt with by the different 
hermeneutical schools of the 19th and 20th centuries. Schleiermacher has worked 
out the first systematic and comprehensive basis of the philosophy of history where 
the emphasis is placed on the interpretation - understanding and misunderstanding 
- of tangible facts, texts, data. That is how the art of understanding is created and 
what Schleiermacher characterizes as the "art of avoiding misunderstanding."1 
Moreover, he adds, "misunderstanding is inherent, and understanding must be 
desired and sought for."2 Schleiermacher introduces these principles primarily 
through the interpretation of the sources of the written text. The thoughts excavated 
out from the text, according to him, can only be deduced only if we trace them back 
to their genesis. He emphasizes that "a series of thoughts arising out as elements of 
life are intertwined with other acts, acts of different nature and, thus, they - these 
thoughts - should be apprehended in their correlation with these acts and should be 
interpreted as complex acts in themselves."3 This idea already points toward the 20th 
century since the grammatical interpretation of texts coordinates the psychological 
interpretation as well, and that notion becomes the central category in Dilthey's 
philosophical system. Thus, the investigative methods of the turn of the century 
place a particular emphasis on what the historian experiences in discovering and 
understanding his own inherent mental processes and his inherent perceptions. The 
understanding of the historical facts is, thus, nothing but the reproduction and scruti-
ny of the original historicity. This is the point where philosophy joins with history, 
when, - as a mental process of secondary in nature - it undertakes the task of inter-
preting the mental process about history itself. 
The psychological and philosophical analysis of facts are very often mixed up, 
though, from the point of view of psychology it is very simple to set up the bound-
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aries; as psychology could be considered such a first-rate mental process where we do 
not deal with the relationship between the thinking process and its object, but, 
rather, it focuses primarily upon the thinking process itself. Whereas the primary target 
of the philosophy of history is the relationship itself that exists between the thinking process 
and its concrete object it aims at. 
It is vital to clarify the differences between philosophy and psychology with 
respect to their approach to history, because their approach and their divergent atti-
tudes towards historical facts represent an essential deviation in their methods regard-
ing to the overall cognition. This fact has to be pointed out, because a particular his-
torical system of belief might even feed itself from a fantasy world, and might search 
for some justification in its fabricated or self-interest driven presentation of historical 
facts. For example, the historian scrutinizing the natural history of dictatorships in the 
history of mankind might, consciously or unconsciously, incorporate his own person-
al and emotional relationships, with his parents, for example, into a certain historical 
epoch. True historiography (and history) can thus simply become a pretext. 
Can we really get to know the real history? Or are we trying to muster the past to 
help us to understand our present? Can a philosopher help a historian? Robin 
G. Collingwood's standpoint is based on the interpretation of the relationship between 
subject and object: "The object that draws the philosopher's attention to is not simply 
the past, as it is in the case of a historian, but the mutually existing relationship of the 
two. Thinking, in relation to its object, is not merely thinking, but it is cognition, so 
what appears in psychology as being the theory of plain thinking is a mental event unre-
lated to every object, whereas, in philosophy, the same manifests itself as the theory of 
cognition. The psychologist is primarily concerned with the followings: How do histo-
rians think? - and the philosopher poses the question like this: How do historians dis-
cern? How do they get to know the past? However, it is not the philosopher's, but rather 
that of the historian's task to seize the past in itself, for example, to tell us that this and 
that event indeed took place many years ago. The philosopher is not interested in these 
events as matters per se, but as matters that have been discerned by the historian, and 
the philosopher does not pose the question as to how these matters look like, but rather, 
what it is that allows the historian to discern them as they are. 
The philosopher has to contemplate about the historian's conscious itself with-
out doubling the efforts being undertaken by the psychologist; for the philosopher 
the historian's mind-set is not an aggregate phenomenon but a system of knowledge. 
He contemplates about the past, too, but not so as to double the historian's work: 
for him the past is not a series of events, but a system of perceived matters. In other 
words, the philosopher, thinking about the subjective side of historiography, is an 
epistemologist, if he contemplates from an objective side, then he becomes a meta-
physician.4 
This opinion may also prove to be false, because it creates the impression that 
the epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the philosopher's work can be 
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separated. Philosophy does not separate the analysis of perception from the analysis 
of what we discern, only that in order to reach a better cognition it temporarily may 
investigate the comparable processes individually. That is how the particular philos-
ophy of history has defined itself and thus differs from other philosophies as such. The 
philosophy of history has always separated itself from epistemology and phenomeno-
logy as the European philosophical thought has always been somehow defined by the 
interpretation of historical projections. The notion to escape to history as the teacher 
of life is always typical of an individual thinker or school of thought when some chal-
lenge - even at the level of everyday politics- being presented by the given epoch -
requires rational explanation. "If, at any historical time, we take into consideration a 
nation's outstanding philosophical topics, we find we can identify those particular 
problems about which they felt they would demand their full spiritual energy. 
Peripheral or miscellaneous topics are the ones that do not present any particular dif-
ficulties."5 
In the 6 century B.C. the Hellenic philosophical traditions aimed at establishing 
the foundations of mathematics. The attention of the theories was focused on the 
mathematical cognition. The philosophical aspect of the Medieval Ages was closely 
tied to theology, the main direction of the speculation delved into the relationship 
between God and man. From the Renaissance on the search for the scientific thought 
in the natural sciences became the main objective. Needless to say people all the time 
contemplated on historical terms but their historical notions and theories were not 
adequate and they lacked the well-established methods of criticism. The 18th cen-
tury represents the big turning point, when Montesquieu, Voltaire, and later Kant 
and Hegel interpret the historical cognition using critical methodical tools, and thus 
they can challenge the previously absolute authority of mathematics, theology and 
natural sciences. Historical speculation can now repossess its own object. "The 
mathematical speculation cannot grasp the past which presents particulars of space 
and time and is comprised of strange events no longer relevant, because this sort of 
speculation deals exactly with those matters where the characteristic space and time 
factors are not present; that is what makes it possible for the mathematical thought 
to discern these matters." The theological speculation is also inadequate to grasp this 
subject, because this system of thought has only one object; and the events of histo-
ry are finite and numerous. Lastly, the natural sciences are also inadequate to discern 
them, because the truths discovered by natural sciences are recognized as truth 
exactly by having been obtained by observation and experimentation, obtained by 
how we perceive them, whereas the past is gone, and the thoughts about it can never 
be verified the same way as hypotheses of the natural sciences."6 
Herder takes consciously upon himself the peculiar speculation of the philosophy 
of history in the modern age.7 According to him, human existence is closely inter-
twined with the organic natural world. The cosmos is there to create a higher order of 
worlds. Herder's views are teleological ones. Every step of the evolution functionally 
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serves the purpose of preparing the next one. None is an end in itself. It is the man 
that presents the final goal of the evolution, he is the climax. Nature is thus justified 
by human rationalism and morality. Herder has quite rigidly applied his teleological 
views and that is one of the reasons why his anthropological notions have been 
exploited by several politically racist theories. His most important merit relating to the 
philosophy of history is his notion that human nature is not an inherent core, but an 
existing and prevalent one. His significance is invaluable, because it was Herder who 
- the first one in the modern age - defined the clear boundaries between nature and 
man, and who explained the practicability and management of laws that were blindly 
followed up until his time. He introduces the thought that will be elaborated on later 
by Kant, namely, processes are governed not by laws but by the reason of the laws. 
Hegel also relies on Herder's thoughts when he discusses the problems of human and 
historic existence, and when he describes the relationship between intellectual exist-
ence and the mind. Kant places Herder's romanticism on rational and critical foun-
dations, as man (in his mental world) is now consciously dissatisfied with his place and 
his restlessness drives him to advance human existence. It is not some high goals that 
direct man, but the selfish dissatisfaction that may provide a faint hope for the historic 
man to break out from his particular and stagnant life. "Man strives for agreement, but 
nature knows it much better what is good for the human race (make note that here 
he does not refer to man as an individual, nor to individuals comprising of a society or 
as a historical totality, but he vaguely refers to man as a universal race or biological 
abstraction) who wants to create friction. Man wants to live comfortably and wants to 
be content, but what nature wants is to force man out of his recklessness and idle sat-
isfaction into work and fatigue that would enable him to create those tools that would 
help him to wisely dispose of the same."8 
Kant presents his philosophy of history in a comprehensive program. According 
to his philosophical system an ideal universal history can be established, but it is 
inevitable to unite the thought systems of history and philosophy. He puts emphasis 
not only on the narrated facts but on the perceived ones as well. It is an integral el-
ement of his philosophy of history that human history progresses in an organized man-
ner characterized by rational thinking, intellect, and maris dissolution in ethical free-
dom, shortly, characterized by morality. According to Kant, the major driving force 
behind all that is irrationality, an existence dominated by passion combined with self-
ish egotism and lack of knowledge. Kant's notions about the philosophy of history -
compared with Hegel's - may seem to be too uncompromising. His arguments relating 
to the progress of history carry rather mitological argumentations, and it could also be 
debated whether history progresses towards the future or ends up in the present. 
Hegel, compared to Kant, can claim several revolutionary notions relating to the 
philosophy of history. He critically separates the notions of history and nature. He 
considers them as an aggregate of processes, and he categorically declares that nature 
does not have its own history. The time and space aspects of nature manifest them-
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selves in the cycle theories, and that during these cycles the fundamental laws never 
change. Nature originates from the relationships of organisms of different nature, but 
Hegel does not postulate time in nature, only logic. It is imperative to clarify that we 
should not confuse the consecutive nature of time factors with the consecutive nature 
of factors relating to logic. While scrutinizing the aspects of the philosophy of history it is 
vital to remind ourselves of Hegel's thoughts, namely, that all events and histories are postu-
lated as the history of the thinking intellect. The most important driving force behind the 
historic events - as Kant, following the footsteps of Hume, has already summed it up 
- is the guiding role of the human reason. Hegel has adapted this thought attaching it 
to the role of the human will and has modernized it in such a way that he elaborates 
on the human mind that manifests itself in the outer deeds. It is also very important 
that Hegel - describing the historic events - places a special emphasis on such notions 
as passion, ambition; in this way he is able to bring the sterilized rationalism of Kant 
into close contact with life. The postulation of the self-development of reason might 
perhaps be the most exciting issue of the post-enlightenment era, because this is where 
Hegel can define the particular system of logic in history. This notion becomes the 
concept of what we call in the philosophical consciousness as the machination of the 
reason. Passion existing in the wild turmoil is hoaxed in by the cunning reason and 
becomes its agent so that the historical logic of reason can materialize. Hegel's philos-
ophy of history is fundamentally rational, but it naturally reflects irrational elements 
as well. What Hegel attempted to illustrate for his own age was that the previous, 
abstract and static picture of the living cosmos was necessary in order to be replaced 
by a dynamic notion of human perception that would point towards the 20th century." 
The process during which the spirit creates the form of its own knowledge is the work 
that is undertaken as historical reality. The religious community, if it is the first man-
ifestation of the substance of the absolute mind, is that raw consciousness which, the 
more barbaric, tougher in its existence, the deeper in its inherent spirit becomes; and 
its own obscure self has a more difficult task to with its own substance, with the sub-
stance that is so alien to its consciousness. 
Only after consciousness has given up hope to eliminate this alien mode and the 
outer characteristics, when it will turn to - the elimination of the alien mode paves 
the way for returning to its own consciousness - itself, to its own world and to its own 
present; it discovers them as its own properties and in this way it makes the first step 
to descend from the intellectual world, or rather to merge its own abstract spirit with 
a real individual ego. On the other hand, it finds its own existence through the obser-
vation of the thought and thus it can perceive this existence; or the other way round, 
it finds its existence in the thinking process."9 This Hegelian thought postulates an 
internally transforming recollection preserved by experience, the real form of which 
is a substance, where the incessantly learning and developing spirit - due to its own 
mobility - will create the yearning for an absolute knowledge that would, in return, 
give birth to the individual ego through absolute notions and the spacial expansion 
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of the mind. "The realm of the spirit that has been established to exist in this way is 
the one in which one replaces the other and each inherits from the previous one so 
as being able to possess the global empire. Its purpose is to explore the depth, and that 
in itself is an absolute notion; this exploration, consequently, results in the elimina-
tion of the depth of the spirit, in other words, it results in the physical expansion of 
the mind and in the negativity of this self-existing ego, that is its manifestation, that 
is its substance and that is also its time; this manifests itself in a such a manner that 
this extrinsic aspect becomes extrinsic in itself, and when a body is in a motion of 
expansion, it exists in depth and in an individual ego.'"0 This quotation is very impor-
tant, because Hegel's views relating to the philosophy of history are closely connect-
ed to the history of politics. According to Kant, history is nothing but the history of 
politics. What Hegel has introduced as a revolutionary innovation is that he studies 
the universal history of the postulated absolute spirit - arts, religion and philosophy 
- , and disconnects himself from the thought (which has become a fixed practice) 
introduced by Bacon, namely, that the historian would simply investigate the devel-
opmental processes of the objective mind, "...history, from the point of view of its 
organizational perception, is the science of the prevailing knowledge" "history per-
ceived provides the foundation for the absolute mind."11 With this thought Hegel has 
created the background for the phibsophy of history to present the dynamic perception of 
man in the modern age. The post-Hegelian historians - parallel to the gradual dissolu-
tion and polarization of the Hegelian philosophy - have been unable to avoid his 
influence and have all expressed some sort of attachment to Hegel in their historiog-
raphy. This influence can well be observed in the theories of Bradley, Bury, 
Oakeshott, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Dilthey and Spengler. In the beginning of 
the 20th century Simmel's and Spengler's theories dominated. Simmel's logic could 
also be considered as anti-Hegelian: he declares that a historian can never really dis-
cern facts provided that knowledge is empirical, since the historian's object is the past 
that is not at our disposal and cannot be observed. A historian can only reconstruct 
based upon documentation, sources and memoirs, but he cannot really opine about 
history unless his personality possesses an intensive intellect. Simmel's major area of 
investigation in the philosophy of history covers the realm where he explores how the 
subjective historical reconstruction reflects objective truths. By the turn of the cen-
tury, however, this notion has been mixed with the positivist legacy, and thus 
Simmel's attempt could be considered as a failure. Spengler's theory of cultural his-
tory, as a matter of fact, is the re-introduction of the so-called cyclical life theory 
established in the ancient times. The early barbarism has been replaced by modern-
age barbarism, and, consequently, culture is dead being unable to orbit around new 
cultural cycles. Spengler's interpretation of history and morphology is also placed 
upon positivism which undertakes primarily the external analysis of historical facts, 
creates generalized laws, employs often non-historic mentality base, moreover, it 
allows itself to practice the art of prophesy. However, his influence has been enormous 
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over the evolution of the theories of the philosophy of history during the 20th century because 
he has drawn the attention to the unique interpretation of the internal structure of the indi-
vidual cultures, and at the same time, he has broken away from the traditionally Europe-
centered mentality. 
This journey, covering the philosophy of history, has intentionally pointed out to 
the particular role these two disciplines have played in history and has made it appre-
hensible that what we have here is an extremely malleable (that can be separated from 
other components of social sciences) and singular segment of human history that is 
completely independent. The concept of the post-modern philosophy of history can-
not be defined so crystal-clearly, because, from the turn of the century on the expo-
nentially increased volume of transient artistic forms prevent us from conducting a 
thoroughful metaphysical investigation of the 20th century philosophy of history. The 
different explosions in the arts, anthropology, the religious-mystical, and the information sci-
ences can relay their messages about the philosophy of history only in an encrypted manner. 
This is, for example, what Richard Rorty's works reflect, namely, that the adequate 
manifestation of individual social periods appear in the existing forms of human atti-
tudes and expressions. "The metaphysician tries to rise above the multitude of images 
hoping that from above he can perceive the adequate but unexpected totality, as a 
sign that he may have glanced at something real, something that creates and is behind 
the images. The ironical Canon, however, I am about to talk about, consists of a series 
of such sort of experimentations that aim at looking at the metaphysical attempts ris-
ing up to the peaks; and that we can glance at the totality that hides behind the mul-
titudinous nature of experimentations. Because of the vertical overview the ironic the-
oretician does not trust the metaphysician's metaphor. He replaces it with the historic 
metaphor that requires us to look back into the past along a horizontal axis. But what 
he looks back at is not a generalized notion, but a very concrete person who writes a 
very concrete type of book. The topic of the ironic theory is the theory of the meta-
physician. For the ironic theoretician the wisdom beyond history or the love of such 
wisdom is nothing but a story about those ongoing experimentations that aim at find-
ing such a final dictionary that is not simply a final dictionary of a certain philosopher, 
but a final dictionary in a comprehensive sense and which is not only a unique histor-
ical product, but represents the final word towards which research and history 
approach, and thus it in itself eliminates research and history themselves."12 
Rorty's ironical and tongue-sticking punning supports the fact that nowadays 
the explorations of the philosophy of history, differing from the classical ages, repro-
duce, more and more often, metaphorical and visual images that also clearly signal 
what Heidegger has already prognosticated in the early '60s: leave metaphysics alone! 
Otherwise, quoting Schiller: 
Out of the chalice of the vast spiritual world 
the Infinite simmers forward.13 
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